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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
One of the main theoretical claims made by Reygadas and Guzmán is that, in order to 
understand how reason and argumentation works in the public sphere, it does not suffice 
to examine the prevailing standpoints and the arguments that support them. They 
emphasize that standpoints and argumentation can only be understood after having a clear 
grasp of, what they call, the global positions of the parties and the sociopolitical topology 
of the debate. Reygadas and Guzmán carefully situate the argumentation that went on 
during and following the Mexican elections of 2006. With them, I am convinced that in 
order to understand and assess a public discourse from an argumentative perspective, we 
should examine the argumentative context in detail. 
 In my comment, I would like to contribute to this view by emphasizing the 
importance of a theory with which to take contextual matters into account. The context 
sketched by the authors is intricate. There is a complicated sequence of political events; 
there is a wide range of political parties pressing forward standpoints; the participants 
perform divergent speech acts such as pressing charges, making complaints, blaming, 
threatening and also arguing; and these utterances can be understood as contributing to 
different kinds of conversational goals, such as arriving at a legal decision, making a deal, 
or resolving a difference of opinion. A way to deal with such complexities is to choose a 
methodological perspective from which to reconstruct and understand the argumentation. 
Such a choice is not so much determined by the actual features of the public debate, as it 
is by research interests. Depending on research interests, we can study the discourse from 
the perspective of adjudication, of negotiation, of deliberation, etc.  
Reygadas and Guzmán point out the importance of one such possible perspective: 
that of the eristic dialogue. Following Walton and Krabbe, I take that to be the kind of 
dialogue where the participants have ample room for venturing blames and grievances 
and where the common goal is to arrive at a provisional accommodation between them 
(1995). I will use this opportunity to elaborate on Walton and Krabbe’s notion of an 
eristic dialogue by understanding it as an argumentative activity type, as explained by 
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Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2005). Concurrently, I will discuss some parts of the 
Mexican debates, as discussed by Reygadas and Guzmán, from the perspective of this 
activity type. 
 
2. THE MEXICAN DEBATES FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF AN ERISTIC 
DIALOGUE  
 
Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2005) point out the importance of distinguishing between 
argumentative activity types and the normative model for critical discussion. The 
normative model is a general procedure that specifies how parties are to proceed in a 
conversation in order to enable and facilitate the resolution of differences of opinion. An 
argumentative activity type, on the other hand, is a theoretical account of an 
institutionalised type of context for argumentation, characterised by conventions that 
influence participants when advancing and understanding argumentation. A model for 
such an activity type contains normative components in that it includes the conventions 
that participants in such a practice impose on each other. But, different from the rules for 
critical discussion, these conventional rules do not necessarily guarantee reasonable 
discussion solely aimed at resolution, even if they govern clearly argumentative moves. 
Examples of argumentative activity types that Van Eemeren and Houtlosser examine are 
negotiation, mediation and adjudication.  
I hold that most of the dialogue types examined by Walton and Krabbe (1995) can 
also best be seen as activity types, rather than as normative models. Among the main 
kinds of dialogue they include persuasion dialogue, negotiation dialogue and eristic 
dialogue. They are not very clear on the issue whether such dialogue types are activity 
types or normative models. Their detailed models for persuasion dialogue are clearly 
normative in nature, while many remarks on the other types apply only to 
conventionalised activity types.  
Walton and Krabbe characterise dialogue types by stating the initial situation, the 
participants’ aims and the main goal. I will focus on eristic dialogue. An eristic dialogue 
starts from an antagonism. Each party aims at defeating the adversary. The main goal is a 
provisional accommodation between the participants (Walton and Krabbe, 2005, pp. 76-
79). Often the antagonism is burdened with great interests and high emotions. That the 
parties seek to defeat each other in such a loaded situation brings the risk that they no 
longer are aiming at any shared conversational goal. As soon as that happens, the 
exchange can no longer be called a called a conversation of the eristic type. But of 
course, eristic dialogues can be brought to a happy end where the result is an 
accommodation that is, at least temporarily, agreeable for the parties. 
In principle, the notion of an eristic dialogue can be developed in two directions. 
First, we can develop normative models for eristics. We could develop the rules and 
norms that would further the main goal of reaching mutually acceptable accommodations. 
(The normative rules that would deal with argumentation would only deal with it as an 
instrument for defeating the adversary without blocking the main goal of a arriving at a 
provisional accommodation. The implicit appeal to reasonableness that is inherent in 
bringing forward argumentation cannot be taken into account by such a normative model. 
So, we would still need a model for critical discussion for the purpose of reconstructing 
and evaluating argumentation.) 
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Second, and that is the route I am interested in here, we can develop a theory 
about eristic dialogue as an conventionalised activity type. In so far as we are interested 
in argumentation within eristic contexts, we can take up Van Eemeren and Houtlosser’s 
proposal to specify such an activity in an analogous way to the normative model for 
critical discussion. That is, in an eristic dialogue we can expect there to exist conventions 
for advancing the initial positions (providing a sort of confrontation stage), conventions 
for reaching agreement about material and procedural starting points (providing a sort of 
opening stage), conventions for exchanging arguments and criticisms, even if they only 
have a perfunctory role to play (providing a sort of argumentation stage) and conventions 
for determining the outcome of the dialogue (providing a sort of concluding stage). 
Moreover, the theory should include the individual aims of the participants: that of 
defeating, outmanoeuvring and outsmarting the adversary. Empirical research, for 
example of the kind that Reygadas and Guzman have carried out, should inform us about 
the nature of these conventions and about cultural varieties of such activity types. 
The result of such an undertaking would be a kind of descriptive model that 
provides a context within which argumentation can be studied. The descriptive model 
would enable us to generate expectations of the kinds of strategic choices that will be 
made by the participants. In the discourse, then, we know what to look for. In order to 
evaluate such argumentatively relevant conversational moves, in the sense of finding out 
whether they are consonant with the idea of reasonable argumentation, we are to apply 
the norms for critical discussion. 
Walton and Krabbe distinguish between two subtypes of eristic dialogue: the 
quarrel and the sophistical dialogue (Walton uses the term sophistical dialogue, 1998; 
Walton and Krabbe use the term eristic discussion, 1995). In short, in a sophistical 
discussion a party tries to win a discussion by clever arguments and by showing that he is 
the party who is best skilled in debate. The main goal is to arrive at new intellectual order 
or hierarchy. In a quarrel, parties are expressing grievances and the main goal is to arrive 
at a new social order or hierarchy. The quarrel is the most relevant subtype for 
understanding the Mexican public debates. I will try to characterise the quarrel as an 
argumentative activity type by specifying what kinds of argumentative contributions can 
be expected in the four stages of a quarrel. 
In the eristic confrontation of a quarrel, an emotionally loaded antagonism is put 
into words. The parties are expected to make it clear in what way and to what degree they 
are emotionally engaged when adopting their position. So, for example, standpoints are 
put into words using highly loaded language, with a clear bias towards their own side, 
and conveying, more or less implicitly, ad hominem charges against the adversaries. For 
example, Obrador advanced the standpoint that “they [Calderon and his National Action 
Party] robbed us of the election” (McKinley, 2006b), both making it clear how he and his 
people have been harmed as well as conveying the badness of the people who are 
responsible for the harm done. 
A party can be expected to disqualify unwelcome standpoints by attacking their 
proponents. Similarly, a way to make one’s own standpoint to appear more agreeable is 
to brush up one’s own ethos. Such manoeuvres are fully in line with the individual aim of 
defeating one’s adversary as well as with the collective goal of finding a new status quo 
based on understanding each others grievances. According to Obrador, Calderon is 
installing a new socialist kind of dictatorship, as Mexico had during the long lasting reign 
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of the Institutional Revolutionary Party, while he presents himself as someone who is 
listening to what the people really want. According to Calderon, Obrador is supposed to 
install a dictatorship in the manner of Hugo Chavez from Venezuela, while he himself is 
trying to save democracy by upholding its laws and institutions. 
In the eristic opening of a quarrel, parties have the opportunity to state their 
common ground, that is, the material and the procedural starting points. For example, in 
the Mexican elections, the parties did accept the election laws. (Even though there did 
arise a dispute over the issue whether these laws are outweighed by the constitution.) 
Similarly, all parties subscribed to the ideology of having democratic elections. These 
common starting points enabled the parties to construct arguments that had some bearing 
on the other side. 
In the eristic argumentative exchange argumentation can serve a number of 
purposes. Parties may want to offer some, more or less perfunctory, support for the 
correctness of their own accusations and for the incorrectness of the counter accusations. 
By doing so they appeal to reasonableness, but the main point of the arguments is not so 
much to get the other party persuaded after having thoroughly tested the argumentative 
defence, but rather to get the other party to back off after understanding how strongly the 
proponent feels about the issue.  
Furthermore, argumentation can be instrumental for getting what you want. A 
quarrel is closely linked to the negotiation dialogue where parties are trying to resolve 
differences of interest by making deals. (Sophistical dialogue is closely linked to 
persuasion dialogue, but gives priority to the semblance of reasonableness at the expense 
of reasonableness itself.) One characteristic of a quarrel is that a party makes it clear how 
seriously he is concerned about the issue, that is, in getting what he wants. That itself is 
an instrument for conveying the thought that it is best for the other party to lower his 
demands on him. One special way of making it clear to the opponent that some good is of 
great importance is to assert that the peaceful relationship between the parties will come 
to an end if the opponent will not give in. So, in quarrels we can expect to find threats of 
that kind. Obrador, for example, makes some implicit threats to terminate the peaceful 
relationship between on the one hand himself and his Party of the Democratic Revolution 
and on the other hand Calderon and his National Action Party. He threatened to stop 
acknowledging the state institutions, by saying “to hell with the institutions.” And he 
even threatened, although implicitly, to use violence, by saying “[w]e don't want to 
generate problems, but they have to understand for once and for all, we are going to 
defend the democracy of this country. We have always acted in a responsible manner, but 
understand me well, everything has its limit” (McKinley, 2006b). From the side of the 
National Action Party suggestions were made to abolish the Party of the Democratic 
Revolution. The leader of the Chamber of Deputies stated that “[t]he Democratic 
Revolution Party should lose its party registration because they don't respect institutions” 
(McKinley, 2006b). By these means, the parties create a situation where the argument 
“lower your demands on me, because that is to your own advantage” can be successful. 
Such purely eristic manoeuvres can be expected to occur together with substantial 
argumentation. One possible way to win an eristic dialogue is by offering sound 
arguments. In the Mexican debate, serious argumentation has been advanced on both 
sides. For example, Obrador’s standpoint has been that the elections were illegitimate. 
First, a law had been broken that states that the president of Mexico is not allowed to 
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participate in the campaigns of his own party that precede general elections. President 
Fox had done so. Second, a law has been broken that states that companies are not 
allowed to contribute to the elections. Some companies, however, implicitly but clearly, 
had campaigned against Obrador. Third, the elections were a fraud due to the alleged fact 
that the counting machines contained an algorithm that guaranteed a win for Calderon 
and due to some irregularities that favoured the National Action Party and disfavoured 
the Party of the Democratic Revolution.  
In an eristic concluding stage, attempts are made to close the discussion, to make 
it appear that one has won and the other one has lost. One nice example is the show of 
hands by which a rallied crowd, a so-called National Convention, denies that Calderon 
has won and affirms that it is Obrador who is the legitimate president (McKinley, 2006a). 
 
3. CONCLUSION  
 
In order to reconstruct and evaluate argumentative discourse, we need (descriptive) 
models for argumentative activity types, in addition to the normative model for critical 
discussion. One of the virtues of the paper by Reygadas and Guzmán is that it can guide 
us when developing theoretical accounts of such activity types. In this commentary, I 
have reflected on eristic dialogue as one such type that is of importance for understanding 
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